Global Communications & Research Development Institute-GCRDI

Tribute to Cat Coore by Olivia Babsy Grange

Name the Jamaican Member of Parliament

Analysis of the Article

The Jamaica Gleaner article (dated January 26, 2026) reports that former FIFA president Sepp Blatter has publicly supported calls for fans to boycott matches hosted in the United States during the 2026 FIFA World Cup (June 11–July 19, co-hosted by the US, Canada, and Mexico). Blatter endorsed comments by Swiss anti-corruption expert Mark Pieth, who advised fans to avoid traveling to the US due to risks of deportation or harsh treatment under the current administration, and to watch matches on TV instead.

Key concerns cited include:

• President Donald Trump’s “expansionist posture” toward Greenland.
• Travel bans and visa restrictions affecting fans from qualifying nations such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Iran, and Haiti (the latter being a Caribbean neighbor to Jamaica).

• Aggressive US immigration enforcement and handling of protests (e.g., in Minneapolis).

This adds to earlier comments from German football federation vice president Oke Göttlich, who suggested serious consideration of a boycott. The calls appear primarily from European figures and focus on political objections to US policies, rather than FIFA or CONCACAF (the regional confederation including Jamaica). No CONCACAF nations or officials are quoted supporting a boycott, and the issue remains speculative with no formal action from FIFA or major federations.

Broader context (based on recent reports):
• The 2026 World Cup draw occurred in December 2025, and qualification is ongoing or in advanced stages.

• Jamaica’s Reggae Boyz narrowly missed automatic qualification (finishing second in their final-round group behind Curaçao in November 2025) and have been pursuing play-off paths (e.g., potential matches against teams like New Caledonia and DR Congo in late 2025). As of January 2026, their status remains in contention or unresolved, but national interest in the tournament is high.

• US visa/travel policies have created hurdles for some nations’ fans, but Jamaica is not listed among banned countries (e.g., recent freezes affect 75 countries for certain visa types, but not broadly for Jamaican visitor visas needed for tourism/World Cup attendance).

• European federations (e.g., France, Germany) have publicly rejected boycott ideas, emphasizing that sport should remain separate from politics.

THE PEOPLES PERSPECTIVE

The Current CARICOM Crisis: Trinidad and Tobago’s Perspective and Regional Tensions.
The headline “Trinidad and Tobago says Caricom has lost its way” directly reflects statements made by Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, who has publicly declared CARICOM “dysfunctional,” “unreliable,” and as having “lost its way.”

This stems from deep disagreements over foreign policy, particularly regarding the United States under President Donald Trump’s second administration and relations with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro regime.

Background and Key Triggers

The crisis intensified in December 2025 amid several U.S. actions under the Trump administration:

• U.S. military buildup and operations in the southern Caribbean: Starting earlier in 2025, the U.S. increased naval presence, conducting strikes on suspected drug-trafficking vessels (some linked to Venezuela). Persad-Bissessar strongly supported these, welcoming U.S. military access (including radar installations in Tobago) and rejecting CARICOM’s longstanding “zone of peace” principle for the region.

• Visa restrictions: On December 16, 2025, the U.S. imposed partial visa restrictions on nationals of Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica, citing concerns over their Citizenship by Investment (CBI) programs lacking residency requirements, which posed vetting challenges. CARICOM’s Bureau (comprising leaders from Jamaica, Barbados, and St. Kitts and Nevis) issued a statement expressing concern and urging dialogue.

• Persad-Bissessar distanced Trinidad and Tobago from this, accusing CARICOM of “disparaging” the U.S. (its “greatest ally”) while allegedly supporting Maduro’s “narco-government.” She argued such positions invite repercussions and prioritized Trinidad and Tobago’s security and economic ties with the U.S.

This led to sharp rebukes:

• Antigua and Barbuda’s Prime Minister Gaston Browne highlighted Trinidad and Tobago’s massive trade surplus with CARICOM (US$1.1 billion in exports in 2024 vs. minimal imports), accusing Persad-Bissessar of undermining regional unity.

• Some Antiguan officials called for boycotting Trinidadian goods, though Browne has emphasized commitment to integration.

• Former Trinidadian PM Keith Rowley and others criticized her as “unpatriotic” and risking isolation.
Broader context includes Trinidad and Tobago’s vulnerability to Venezuelan threats (e.g., territorial claims) and drug/gun trafficking, contrasted with other CARICOM members’ preference for non-alignment and dialogue with Venezuela.

Analysis: Has CARICOM Truly “Lost Its Way”?
From Trinidad and Tobago’s viewpoint (as articulated by Persad-Bissessar):

• CARICOM’s positions appear detached from realities like security threats from Venezuela and dependence on U.S. protection/trade.

• Perceived inconsistencies (e.g., criticizing U.S. actions while engaging Maduro) risk alienating the region’s most powerful partner, potentially harming tourism, remittances, and security cooperation.

• Trinidad and Tobago, as CARICOM’s largest economy and energy exporter, benefits significantly from the single market but feels burdened by free movement and perceived barriers elsewhere.
Critics within the region argue:

• Persad-Bissessar’s unilateralism weakens collective bargaining power for small states against superpowers.

• Aligning too closely with Trump risks precedent for U.S. interventionism, echoing historical concerns (e.g., 1983 Grenada invasion).

• 2025 saw progress in integration (e.g., advancing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy), making this fracture particularly damaging.

The Trump administration’s approach—bilateral dealings, tariffs, visa measures, and military assertiveness—exploits these divisions, shifting from multilateral engagement to “hemispheric primacy.”
Impacts of the Trump Administration
Trump’s policies have amplified the crisis:

• Security and military: Increased operations target trafficking but raise fears of escalation toward Venezuela, pressuring CARICOM neutrality.

• Immigration/Visas: Restrictions on CBI countries highlight U.S. leverage over economic programs vital for smaller states.

• Trade/Economy: Potential tariffs and reduced aid/remittances threaten growth; Trinidad and Tobago’s energy exports to the U.S. may insulate it somewhat.

• Diplomatic shift: Preference for bilateral ties over CARICOM undermines regional solidarity, as seen in separate U.S. engagements with Guyana, Jamaica, etc.

Overall, these create a “might makes right” dynamic, forcing CARICOM members to navigate between U.S. pressure and principles of sovereignty/non-intervention.

Recommendations for Resolution
To heal fractures while accounting for Trump-era realities:

1. Convene an early emergency summit: As suggested in The Gleaner editorial, hold an in-person intersessional meeting (proposed by leaders like Browne or Jamaica’s Andrew Holness) for frank dialogue. Virtual formats have limitations; face-to-face could rebuild trust.

2. Strengthen consensus mechanisms on foreign policy: CARICOM should allow opt-outs for sensitive issues (e.g., Venezuela/U.S. relations) without public disavowals, preserving unity on core areas like trade and climate.

3. Diversify partnerships: Accelerate ties with BRICS nations, Europe, and Canada to reduce U.S. dependence, while maintaining pragmatic bilateral relations.

4. Avoid escalation: Reject boycotts or rhetoric that deepens divides; focus on mutual benefits (e.g., Trinidad’s energy supporting regional development

5. Private sector and civil society role: Groups like the CARICOM Private Sector Organisation have reaffirmed commitment to integration—leverage them for pressure toward reconciliation.

6. Long-term reform: Address longstanding grievances (e.g., non-tariff barriers, free movement implementation) to make CARICOM more effective and equitable.

CARICOM has survived past crises (e.g., 1983 Grenada) through dialogue. With disciplined diplomacy, it can navigate Trump-era pressures without implosion—but inaction risks permanent fragmentation, harming all members in a volatile global environment. Regional unity remains the best bulwark for small states.