11/06/2026
A Response to Chollom Gyang Logwong's Rejoinder on the Historical Indigeneity of Hausa-Fulani Communities in Plateau State
By BALA BABA MUHAMMAD, A.DRI
I have read Chollom Gyang Logwong's response to Sani Ibn Salihu with the attention it deserves. What emerges is a document that relies heavily on rhetorical invective, selective citation of colonial records, and a foundational misunderstanding of how Nigerian constitutional law actually defines indigeneity. Logwong writes with considerable passion, but passion is not a substitute for legal analysis, and historical narrative is not the same as binding judicial precedent. Before addressing his substantive claims, it is necessary to clear away the ad hominem distractions that permeate his piece.
Logwong begins by dismissing Sani Ibn Salihu's knowledge as "shallow, constricted and horrific," accusing him of assembling "conflicting colonial records with contradicting themes" and displaying "a comprehensive inability in the interpretation of records." He then makes the curious assertion that Salihu's conclusion "supported the very fact he set out to dismantle" — an accusation that Logwong never actually proves with specific examples from Salihu's text. This is the classic rhetorical maneuver of attacking the person rather than engaging the argument. Logwong then indulges in an extended personal attack on Salihu's professional history, referencing a radio program called "Mazan Jiya" from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s and accusing Salihu and his brother of assembling "imbecilic and senile octogenarians" to manufacture a "doctored history." Even if these allegations were true — and Logwong offers no evidence beyond his own assertion — they would have no bearing on the legal and historical questions at hand. The ad hominem attack is a logical fallacy, and it is disappointing to see it deployed so prominently in what purports to be a serious historical rejoinder.
Having dispensed with the rhetorical excess, we must now turn to the substance. Logwong's primary error is not merely interpretive but foundational: he presumes that indigeneity is established exclusively through what he calls "ancestry, history, land and conquest" — with conquest apparently meaning successful defense against invasion. This is a standard of his own invention, unsupported by Nigerian jurisprudence, colonial administrative practice, or the text of the 1999 Constitution. Nowhere does Logwong cite any judicial authority for his definition. He simply asserts it as self-evident and proceeds to judge all claims against his own invented yardstick.
The colonial archives that Logwong claims to revere tell a far more complex story than his binary framework can accommodate. S.E.M. Stobart, a colonial administrator whose reports Logwong selectively cites, documented that Hausa warriors had settled in Naraguta and established a chieftaincy under Mallam Bunu, a vassal of the Emir of Bauchi, prior to European arrival. Naraguta was formally designated a "Hausa village" by colonial administrators in 1904. Critically, the colonial classification of "Hausa" encompassed "all or most of the aliens from other parts of the Northern Provinces and from French territory" — meaning it was not an ethnic designation in the modern sense but an administrative category recognizing a distinct population with its own governance structures that predated British conquest. Logwong conveniently ignores these records because they complicate his narrative of exclusive Berom, Irigwe, Bache, Buji, Amo, Jarawa and Jere primacy.
Logwong's invocation of the 1873 battle of Naraguta as conclusive proof of non-indigeneity is historically naive. The existence of conflict between populations does not foreclose subsequent co-settlement or the acquisition of territorial belonging through intermarriage, economic integration, and multi-generational residence. If Logwong's logic were applied consistently, half of Europe would have no claim to indigeneity anywhere — the English would have to exclude descendants of Norman invaders, the French would have to exclude descendants of Viking settlers, and the Spanish would have to exclude descendants of Moorish populations who lived on the Iberian Peninsula for centuries. History is not a freeze-frame of a single battle. It is a continuous process of migration, settlement, conflict, and integration. Logwong's approach freezes Jos in 1873 and declares the matter permanently settled. That is not history; it is ideology.
Furthermore, Logwong's characterization of the Sokoto Caliphate forces as "terrorist groups of 1873" is a breathtaking anachronism that exposes his methodological bankruptcy. The Sokoto Caliphate was a pre-colonial state system recognized by British colonial authorities, with established governance structures, judicial systems, and territorial administration. Characterizing it as "terrorist" is not historical analysis; it is inflammatory rhetoric designed to delegitimize rather than inform. Logwong asks triumphantly: "How can a terrorist group of 1873 turned out to claim indigeneship of the same region it waged war against?" The answer is simple: by settling there, intermarrying, raising children, paying taxes, developing land, and contributing to governance for over a century. That is how indigeneity has always worked in human societies. No population remains static. No territorial claim is eternal and unchanging. Logwong's framework would require us to declare that the only true indigenes of any territory are those who were there first — which would mean displacing virtually every population on earth.
Logwong also argues that because Berom and other populations preceded Hausa-Fulani migration, Hausa-Fulani cannot be indigenes. This ignores the constitutional principle of jus sanguinis — the right of blood — as articulated in Section 25(1)(a) and (b) of the 1999 Constitution. Citizenship and indigene status flow from parentage, not from primordial arrival. A child born to parents who are themselves indigenes of a place is an indigene of that place, regardless of when the child's ancestors first arrived. Logwong offers no rebuttal to this constitutional principle because he cannot. His entire framework depends on ignoring it.
The Plateau State High Court's June 9, 2026 judgment in Fatima Baba Akawu and Another v. Jos North Local Government Council, Suit Number PLD/J215/202, has now settled this matter authoritatively. The facts of that case are simple but profound. Fatima Baba Akawu, a Hausa woman born and raised in Jos North, applied for a Certificate of Indigene — the document that unlocks access to government employment, admissions, and other public benefits. Instead, the Council issued her a so-called "Residential Certificate." On the very same occasion, a Berom applicant named Dung Bot was issued a proper Indigene Certificate. The Council, in effect, told Fatima: you are a Hausa, so you can only be a resident, not an indigene. The Council did not even bother to defend its action, failing to appear in court or file any response.
The court, relying on the Supreme Court's binding decision in Anzaku v. Governor of Nasarawa State from 2013 and the clear language of Section 42 of the 1999 Constitution, declared that the "Residential Certificate" is not recognized by any Nigerian law and is void ab initio with no legal effect whatsoever. The court held that the refusal to issue an Indigene Certificate to Fatima Baba Akawu while issuing one to a Berom applicant constitutes discriminatory practice in violation of Sections 42(1), 42(2), 15(2), and 17(2)(a) of the Constitution, as well as Articles 2 and 3 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Most critically for our purposes, the court held that a child of a bona fide indigene — regardless of the child's ethnic origin — is automatically entitled to indigene status flowing from the parent. The court ordered Jos North Local Government Council to issue a Certificate of Indigene to Fatima Baba Akawu within thirty days and issued a perpetual injunction restraining the Council from ever issuing "Residential Certificates" as a substitute for Certificates of Indigene.
Logwong does not mention this judgment. He cannot, because it demolishes his entire framework. The Akawu judgment is not a technicality. It is a judicial declaration that the very system Logwong defends — the categorical exclusion of Hausa-Fulani citizens from indigene status based on nothing more than their ethnic origin — is unconstitutional. The PIDAN narrative, which Logwong implicitly defends, rests on the idea that "indigene" is an ethnic label exclusive to certain groups. The Akawu judgment repudiates this idea as unconstitutional discrimination. This is not my opinion. It is the holding of a court of record sitting in Jos, the very city at the heart of this dispute.
Logwong's reliance on the Fibersima, Niki Tobi, and Ajibola Commissions is similarly selective. He cites these Commissions as having "convincingly laid this matter to rest," but he does not disclose what these Commissions actually found. The Ajibola Commission of 2008 documented that Fulani pastoralists began arriving in Jos in 1949 to sell milk to British tin miners, and that the Berom "gave portions of land to the Fulani on loan." This created a landlord-tenant relationship, not an exclusionary indigene-settler binary. Crucially, the Ajibola Commission found that Hausa-Fulani had more electoral wards with fewer registered voters than indigenous tribes, and that this arrangement "benefited the Hausa-Fulani politically and marginalized other groups." In other words, the Commission recognized that Hausa-Fulani were not disenfranchised second-class citizens but active political participants whose voting power was systematically amplified through ward demarcation. Logwong fails to mention this finding because it undermines his narrative of total exclusion. The Fiberesima Commission recorded that some Hausa-Fulani witnesses "produced documents in which, according to him, were recorded facts to show that his Hausa-Fulani (Jasawa) people are indigenes of Jos." The Commission did not dismiss these claims as frivolous. It acknowledged the complexity of the matter. Logwong oversimplifies these Commission findings to fit his binary framework, but the actual records tell a messier, more complicated story.
Logwong also raises the issue of Alhaji Sale Hassan, claiming that Hassan "traveled all the way to Bauchi North senatorial district" to contest elections in 1979 as evidence of "manipulation." Logwong omits a crucial detail: the 1979 elections were conducted under a different constitutional framework entirely. The choice of where to contest was a political calculation available to any citizen with multiple affiliations. Logwong does not — because he cannot — cite any judicial finding that Hassan committed electoral fraud or that his actions invalidate the indigene claims of all Hausa-Fulani. This is guilt by association, not legal reasoning. By Logwong's logic, any Berom politician who has ever contested elections outside Plateau State would be evidence that Berom claims to indigeneity are fraudulent. Logwong would never accept such reasoning, and he should not expect others to accept it when applied to Hausa-Fulani.
Perhaps the lowest point in Logwong's rejoinder is his reference to "northern prostitutes" and "yayan karuwai — children of prostitutes" as part of the history of Jos. He writes: "History of Jos is incomplete without a mention of the roles played by northern prostitutes in the peopling of the town and subregion, as well as the making of the proletarian laborforce in the mining camps." This is not historical analysis. It is class-based and gender-based stigmatization deployed to delegitimize an entire population. Logwong offers no evidence that any particular individual's claim to indigeneity is invalidated by the occupation of an ancestor. He simply invokes the specter of s*x work to insinuate moral degeneracy among Hausa-Fulani settlers. This argument is legally irrelevant, historically sloppy, and morally repugnant. The Akawu court's holding on non-discrimination applies with equal force to class-based exclusion. A child born to any parent — regardless of the parent's occupation — is entitled to indigene status flowing from that parent. Logwong's attempt to weaponize the occupation of s*x workers against an entire ethnic population is unworthy of serious historical discourse.
Logwong also raises the question of why Fulani hardos are now resisting being grouped with Hausa leadership. He writes: "I have attended many meetings recently, where Fulani hardos vehemently resisted against Hausa community leaders speak for and on their behalf. They insisted the two are not one and the same." Even if this is true — and Logwong offers no verifiable evidence — it is irrelevant to the legal question at hand. The fact that some Fulani prefer separate representation does not negate the indigene claims of either Hausa or Fulani individuals who can trace parentage to Jos North. Logwong seems to believe that internal disagreements within a community somehow invalidate the community's legal claims. That is not how the law works. The Akawu judgment applies to Hausa and Fulani citizens equally because it applies to all citizens regardless of ethnic origin.
Logwong's final argument is that "there is no portion of the Nigerian Constitution 1999 (as amended), where it is amply stated that living in a place for 100 years automatically confers indigeneship." This is a straw man argument. No serious advocate for Hausa-Fulani indigeneity has claimed that mere duration of residence confers indigene status. The claim is that children born to parents who are themselves indigenes acquire indigene status by operation of jus sanguinis. The Akawu court expressly adopted this reasoning. The question, therefore, is not whether Hausa-Fulani have lived in Jos for one hundred years — they have, but that is not the legal basis of their claim. The question is whether any particular Hausa-Fulani individual can trace parentage to a recognized indigene of Jos North. The Akawu court found that Fatima Baba Akawu could — because her father, Alhaji Baba Akawu, who represented Jos North in the House of Representatives in the Second Republic, was himself an indigene.
What emerges from this analysis is clear. Logwong's historical rejoinder rests on a definition of indigeneity that has no foundation in Nigerian law. He treats "ancestry, history, land and conquest" as exclusive criteria, but he cites no constitutional provision, no statute, and no judicial precedent for this definition. He selectively quotes colonial records while ignoring those that complicate his narrative. He cites judicial Commissions of Inquiry while omitting their findings that undermine his case. He engages in ad hominem attacks, class-based stigmatization, and guilt by association. And he completely ignores a binding judgment from a Plateau State High Court delivered just two days before his rejoinder — a judgment that declares the entire framework of ethnic exclusion unconstitutional.
The Akawu judgment offers a path forward that Logwong's binary framework cannot accommodate. Indigene status is determined by parentage, not by ethnic origin. A Berom child born to Berom parents is an indigene of Berom ancestral territory. A Hausa child born to Hausa parents who are themselves indigenes of Jos North — by virtue of parentage, not by virtue of being Hausa — is equally entitled to indigene status. This is not "citizenship apartheid" as Logwong might characterize it. It is the rule of law — the application of constitutional principles without regard to ethnicity.
I do not write to erase Berom, Afizere, or Anaguta history. Their presence on the Jos Plateau predates Hausa-Fulani migration. Their contributions to the region are undeniable and should be celebrated. But priority of arrival does not translate into perpetual exclusion of later arrivals' descendants. That is not how any functioning multi-ethnic society operates. The United States does not tell descendants of Italian immigrants that they can never be "indigenous" to New York because the Lenape were there first. Britain does not tell descendants of Norman invaders that they can never be English because the Anglo-Saxons preceded them. Nigeria should not tell Hausa-Fulani citizens whose families have lived in Jos for over a century that they are permanent aliens in their own country.
The path to peace in Jos is not through historical grievance — it is through constitutional compliance.Ingeneity shall be a product of preserving humanity. The Plateau State High Court has spoken. The "Residential Certificate" is dead. The practice of issuing different certificates to different ethnic groups is unconstitutional. Logwong may not like this outcome, but his disagreement with the law does not change what the law is. He is entitled to his historical opinions, but he is not entitled to ignore binding judicial precedent. The question now is whether the people of Plateau State will accept the rule of law or continue to organize their civic lives around ethnic exclusion. Inclusivity drives development faster.Plateau state deserves peaceful co-existence recognising the plurality of its population. Arguments around and about exclusion of certain tribes is not favourable for the political economy of the states.Lost of citizens were forced out by denial of indegene certification,only to be imformally celebrated on attainment of higher political,proffessional,or technocratic national positions by state actors later. The Akawu judgment answers that question for them. Compliance is not optional. The court has ordered Jos North Local Government Council to issue Fatima Baba Akawu her Certificate of Indigene within thirty days, and the Council has no lawful choice but to comply. Every other Local Government Council in Plateau State should take note. The era of using "Residential Certificates" to create second-class citizens is over. The Constitution has prevailed. Let equity reign, let fairness thrive, and may Jos North finally find its long-awaited peace. The love of the Hausa people for the good and wellbeing of plateau state is unquestionable. Over the years their economic,social and political contributions are open and rich in the affairs of plateau state.Together we can move the state towards a stable,firm and enviable height of respect,accomodation and resources needed to build the centre of peace and tourism.Finally,I call on the committee set by Governor Callep Muftwang after their meeting with President Bola Ahmed Tinubu on peace in plateau state to objectively consider this judgement as timely and materially beneficial for consideration of a new evolving plateau state devoid of rancour,conflicts but full of peaceful co-existence.
God bless the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
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